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PORTER, Circuit Judge. 
 
The Republic of Poland requested, and the Internal Revenue Service issued, a 
third-party administrative summons under the United States–Poland Tax Treaty1 to assist 
with its ongoing investigation into potential Polish income tax liabilities of G2A.COM 
Sp. z.o.o. (Ltd.). G2A petitioned to quash the subpoena and now challenges the District 
Court’s partial denial of its petition. G2A argues on appeal that (1) it should have 
received notice before the IRS served the summons on a third party that Poland believed 
may have relevant information, and (2) the IRS failed to follow the procedures of the 
Hague Service Convention.2 We disagree and will affirm the judgment of the District 
Court. 
I 
Since 2013, the Polish tax authority has been investigating G2A, a Polish company 
involved in video-game trade, for Polish tax liabilities. As part of that investigation, 
Poland contacted the United States to request information from Gate Arena, a Delaware 
limited liability company that Poland suspected was linked to G2A. Poland initiated the 
request under the Tax Treaty, which permits both countries to request tax-related 
information from each other to prevent double taxation and tax evasion. 
                                              
1 Convention Between the Government of the United States of America and the 
Government of the Polish People’s Republic for the Avoidance of Double Taxation and 
the Prevention of Fiscal Evasion with Respect to Taxes on Income, Oct. 8, 1974, 28 
U.S.T. 891 (“Tax Treaty”). 
2 Convention on the Service Abroad of Judicial and Extrajudicial Documents in 
Civil and Commercial Matters, Nov. 15, 1965, 20 U.S.T. 361, 658 U.N.T.S. 163 (“Hague 
Service Convention”). 
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In accordance with the Tax Treaty, on June 28, 2017 the IRS served a summons 
on the Corporation Trust Company (“CTC”), Gate Arena’s listed registered agent, 
requesting 16 categories of information about Gate Arena’s transactions with G2A. The 
next day, the IRS sent notice of service and a partial copy of the summons by registered 
mail to G2A in Poland, which G2A received on July 12, 2017. The IRS thus complied 
with the notice requirement of 26 U.S.C. § 7609(a) (notice of the third-party summons 
must be sent to the person identified in the summons within 3 days of the day on which 
service is made and no later than 23 days before the date upon which any responsive 
records are to be examined). CTC responded to the summons on July 10, 2017—two days 
before G2A received its copy. 
CTC informed the IRS that though it was listed as the registered agent, it had no 
records of CTC’s actually serving as Gate Arena’s agent or representative and therefore 
had no records responsive to the summons. So, the IRS withdrew the summons. 
Nonetheless, the IRS still intends to issue a report to the Polish authority, which G2A 
asserts will bolster Poland’s tax liability investigation against it by making Gate Arena 
appear to be a shell company. The District Court found that even though the summons 
has been withdrawn, the issues raised are not moot. We agree. 
G2A moved to quash the summons on multiple grounds. The District Court 
granted G2A’s petition in part, quashing two requests which the government declined to 
defend. The District Court denied the rest of G2A’s petition for the remaining requests. 
On appeal, G2A contends the IRS failed to give G2A advance notice of the summons as 
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required by the Internal Revenue Code and Tax Treaty, and that the IRS’s notice sent by 
registered mail violated the Hague Service Convention.  
II 
The District Court had jurisdiction over G2A’s petition to quash the IRS’s 
summons under 26 U.S.C. § 7609(h)(1) and 28 U.S.C. §§ 1340 and 1346. We have 
jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291. We review the enforceability of an IRS summons de 
novo. United States v. Ins. Consultants of Knox, Inc., 187 F.3d 755, 759 (7th Cir. 1999). 
The Internal Revenue Code permits the IRS to issue summonses “[f]or the purpose 
of ascertaining the correctness of any return, making a return where none has been made, 
determining the liability of any person for any internal revenue tax …, or collecting any 
such liability.” 26 U.S.C. § 7602(a). For the same purpose, it also permits the IRS  to 
“examine any books, papers, records, or other data which may be relevant or material.” 
Id. The IRS may also issue summonses and examine data when requested by a treaty 
partner. See, e.g., United States v. Stuart, 489 U.S. 353 (1989); Lidas, Inc. v. United 
States, 238 F.3d 1076, 1081 (9th Cir. 2001).  
A party may challenge a summons in a federal district court under 26 U.S.C. 
§ 7604(a). Bearing the initial burden at the outset, “the IRS need only demonstrate good 
faith in issuing the summons.” Stuart, 489 U.S. at 359. The Supreme Court has 
established four factors for determining whether the IRS acted in good faith. United 
States v. Powell, 379 U.S. 48, 57–58 (1964). The IRS must show that: (1) “the 
investigation will be conducted pursuant to a legitimate purpose,” (2) “the inquiry may be 
relevant to the purpose,” (3) “the information sought is not already within the [IRS’s] 
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possession,” and (4) “the administrative steps required by the [Internal Revenue] Code 
have been followed.” Id.; United States v. Rockwell Int’l, 897 F.2d 1255, 1262 (3d Cir. 
1990). Additionally (though not relevant here), a referral to the Department of Justice for 
criminal prosecution precludes enforcement of an IRS summons. United States v. LaSalle 
Nat’l Bank, 437 U.S. 298, 318 (1978); United States v. Cortese, 614 F.2d 914, 919 (3d 
Cir. 1980). 
The government can satisfy the Powell factors by submitting an affidavit from the 
investigating agent. United States v. Clarke, 573 U.S. 248, 250 (2014); Cortese, 614 F.2d 
at 919 n.7; see also United States v. McCarthy, 514 F.2d 368 (3d Cir. 1975). After the 
government makes a prima facie case, the taxpayer may still “challenge the summons on 
any appropriate ground.” Powell, 379 U.S. at 58 (quotation omitted). But “the taxpayer 
bears a heavy burden of establishing an abuse of the court’s process.” LaSalle Nat’l Bank, 
437 U.S. at 317; Cortese, 614 F.2d at 919. An abuse of the court’s process exists if the 
taxpayer shows, for example, that the government issued the summons “for an improper 
purpose, such as to harass the taxpayer or to put pressure on him to settle a collateral 
dispute, or for any other purpose reflecting on the good faith of the particular 
investigation.” Cortese, 614 F.2d at 919 (quoting Powell, 379 U.S. at 58). We will 
address G2A’s arguments in turn. 
A 
The District Court properly found that, because the IRS agent provided an 
affidavit satisfying the Powell factors for a prima facie case, the burden shifted to G2A to 
refute those factors or challenge the summons in another way. G2A argues now, as it did 
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before the District Court, that the government has not satisfied the fourth factor in 
Powell’s good-faith test because the IRS did not follow the administrative steps of the 
Internal Revenue Code. Specifically, G2A argues that notice must be given to the 
taxpayer before the IRS may contact a third party. See 26 U.S.C. § 7602(c)(1)(A) (“An 
officer or employee of the Internal Revenue Service may not contact any person other 
than the taxpayer with respect to the determination or collection of the tax liability of 
such taxpayer unless” the IRS provides “notice which informs the taxpayer that contacts 
with persons other than the taxpayer are intended to be made.”); see also § 7609(a). G2A 
contends that because it received notice after the IRS served the summons on CTC, the 
IRS violated this provision of the Code. 
The District Court rejected G2A’s argument, concluding that a Department of 
Treasury regulation expressly exempts inquiries on behalf of foreign jurisdictions from 
the advance-notice requirement. Specifically, the regulation excludes liability for any tax 
imposed by any other jurisdiction from the “tax liability” referenced in § 7602(c). 26 
C.F.R. § 301.7602-2(c)(3)(i)(C).3 We agree with the District Court. Congress gave the 
Secretary of the Treasury the authority to prescribe rules and regulations for enforcing the 
Internal Revenue Code, and the Treasury regulation was promulgated under that express 
authority. 26 U.S.C. § 7805(a). If a regulation reasonably interprets and implements an 
ambiguous statutory provision, it must be given judicial deference. United States v. 
                                              
3 “Tax Liability. A tax liability means the liability for any tax imposed by title 26 of 
the United States Code (including any interest, additional amount, addition to the tax, or 
penalty) and does not include the liability for any tax imposed by any other jurisdiction nor 
any liability imposed by other Federal statutes.” (Emphasis added.) 
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Haggar Apparel Co., 526 U.S. 380, 383 (1999). And this Treasury regulation reasonably 
interprets “tax liability,” on which the statute was silent, to mean only taxes imposed by 
the United States. This interpretation is consistent with the purpose § 7602, which is to 
“determin[e] the liability of any person for any internal revenue tax.” (Emphasis added). 
G2A argued to the District Court that the Treasury regulation impermissibly 
created a new exception not recognized by the statute, but it has abandoned that argument 
on appeal.  Instead, G2A now argues that the Tax Treaty “only allows the IRS to obtain 
and provide information related to Polish tax liabilities through the same administrative 
practices by which the IRS is authorized to investigate tax liabilities under the [Internal 
Revenue] Code.” In other words, G2A argues that the Tax Treaty forecloses reliance on 
the Treasury regulation and provides the only method by which the IRS may obtain tax-
related information from third parties. G2A bases its argument on the last phrase of 
Article 23 of the Tax Treaty: 
If specifically requested by the competent authority of a Contracting State, 
the competent authority of the other Contracting State shall provide 
information under this article in the form of depositions of witnesses and 
copies of unedited original documents (including books, papers, statements, 
records, accounts, or writings), to the same extent such depositions and 
documents can be obtained under the laws and administrative practices of 
each Contracting State with respect to its own laws.  
 
28 U.S.T. 891, Art. 23 (emphasis added). 
As an initial matter, G2A forfeited this argument by failing to present it to the 
District Court. To preserve a matter for appellate review, a party must develop the 
argument before the district court “at a point and in a manner that permits the court to 
consider its merits.” Garza v. Citigroup, Inc., 881 F.3d 277, 284 (3d Cir. 2018) (quoting 
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Shell Petroleum, Inc. v. United States, 182 F.3d 212, 218 (3d Cir. 1999)); see also 
DIRECTV, Inc. v. Seijas, 508 F.3d 123, 125 n.1 (3d Cir. 2007). “[M]erely raising an issue 
that encompasses the appellate argument is not enough.” Spireas v. Comm’r of Internal 
Revenue, 886 F.3d 315, 321 (3d Cir. 2018) (quoting United States v. Joseph, 730 F.3d 
336, 337 (3d Cir. 2013)). Rather, the argument must have been made with “exacting 
specificity” in the district court.  Id. 
 Here, in its amended petition to quash the IRS’s summons, G2A gestured toward 
its Article 23 argument in a footnote related to standing. But footnoting an issue for 
standing purposes is not the same as raising it on the merits. See John Wyeth & Bro. Ltd. 
v. CIGNA Int’l Corp., 119 F.3d 1070, 1076 n.6 (3d Cir. 1997) (“[A]rguments raised in 
passing (such as, in a footnote), but not squarely argued, are considered waived.”).  
G2A asks us to excuse forfeiture, as we have discretion to do. See Barefoot 
Architect, Inc. v. Bunge, 632 F.3d 822, 834–35 (3d Cir. 2011). We will consider forfeited 
arguments in “exceptional circumstances” such as when consideration of an issue would 
serve a public interest, when an argument is “closely related” to the arguments raised 
below, and when its application would not further the purposes of forfeiture, including 
the judicial interests that it serves. Tri-M Grp., LLC v. Sharp, 638 F.3d 406, 416–17 (3d 
Cir. 2011). None of these exceptional circumstances are present here, so we decline to 
excuse G2A’s forfeiture. 
G2A argues that we should excuse forfeiture because its new argument raises an 
issue of first impression and future litigants might benefit from our analysis. We disagree 
that every novel argument necessarily impacts the public interest just because it is novel. 
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We find no other instances of a party challenging the Treasury regulation in this context, 
which suggests that resolution of the question here would impact only the parties to this 
case. Compare Gen. Refractories Co. v. First State Insur. Co., 855 F.3d 152, 162 (3d Cir. 
2017) (excusing waiver because the implications of the legal question would affect many 
insurers and insureds beyond the immediate suit). Other than the novelty of its argument, 
G2A offers no other public-interest reason for why we should address the forfeited 
argument.  
G2A also argues that it sufficiently previewed in the District Court the 
components of its new argument on appeal. We disagree. G2A’s original argument 
exclusively required the District Court to interpret § 7602, not decide the issue of whether 
the Tax Treaty dictates how the IRS may request tax information from third parties. 
Though both arguments assume that the Treasury regulation cannot excuse the IRS from 
providing notice before serving a third-party subpoena, the arguments rely on 
propositions so distinct that we do not consider them “closely related.” 
Finally, G2A argues that judicial interests which forfeiture seeks to preserve 
would not be impacted—because the new argument is a purely legal question and the 
government had an opportunity to respond. But courts also have an interest in “promoting 
the finality of judgments and conserving judicial resources and preventing district courts 
from being reversed on grounds that were never urged or argued before [them].” Lesende 
v. Borrero, 752 F.3d 324, 333 (3d Cir. 2014) (quoting Webb v. City of Phila., 562 F.3d 
256, 263 (3d Cir. 2009)). Permitting every forfeited legal argument on appeal would 
make the forfeiture doctrine the rule, not the exception. Singleton v. Wuff, 428 U.S. 106, 
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120 (1976) (“It is the general rule, of course, that a federal appellate court does not 
consider an issue not passed upon below.”). We will enforce the rule here. 
In any event, excusing forfeiture would not change the outcome in this case. 
Contrary to G2A’s suggestion, the Tax Treaty does not bind each country to follow the 
investigative procedures of its internal law when gathering information in response to a 
treaty partner’s request. In fact, Article 23 of the Tax Treaty is not about investigative 
procedures at all; it simply allows Poland and the United States to request that each 
country provide materials such as “depositions of witnesses and copies of unedited 
original documents … to the same extent such materials can be obtained under the laws 
and administrative practices” of the producing country. 28 U.S.T. 891, Art. 23 (emphasis 
added). In other words, the Tax Treaty discusses the form and extent to which countries 
will share information with each other, not how countries may obtain such information in 
the first instance. See James P. Springer, An Overview of International Evidence and 
Asset Gathering in Civil and Criminal Tax Cases, 22 Geo. Wash. J. Int’l L. & Econ. 277, 
288–89 (1989) (describing the purpose of model provisions such as Article 23 in United 
States tax treaties as allowing treaty signatories to receive evidence in a form admissible 
in domestic judicial proceedings). 
B 
The day after the IRS served the summons on CTC, it sent notice of service and a 
copy of the summons by registered mail to G2A in Poland. G2A contends this violated 
the administrative steps for providing notice under the Hague Service Convention 
because Poland prohibits service of foreign documents within its borders by mail. 
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According to G2A, this prohibition on effecting service by mail encompasses the IRS’s 
provision of notice of the third-party summons by registered mail. 
The Hague Service Convention provides “a simpler way to serve process abroad, 
to assure that defendants sued in foreign jurisdictions would receive actual and timely 
notice of suit, and to facilitate proof of service abroad.” Volkswagenwerk 
Aktiengesellschaft v. Schlunk, 486 U.S. 694, 698 (1988). It applies in all cases, whether 
civil or commercial, where there is occasion to “transmit a judicial or extrajudicial 
document for service abroad.” 20 U.S.T. 361, Art. 1. The Convention provides several 
methods by which signatories can effect service of process.  Primarily, each signatory 
must “establish a central authority to receive requests for service of documents from 
other countries.” Schlunk, 486 U.S. at 698 (citing 20 U.S.T. 361, Art. 2). Besides 
establishing that central authority, a country may consent to other forms of service; for 
example, under Article 10 signatories agree not to interfere with “the freedom to send 
judicial documents, by postal channels, directly to persons abroad.” 20 U.S.T. 361, Art. 
10. But Article 10 also permits signatories to object to service of documents by mail. Id.  
Poland has opted out of Article 10, disallowing service of judicial documents by 
mail. See Hague Service Convention, Reservation of Poland; G2A argues that the notice 
of summons was a judicial document and that the IRS improperly sent it by registered 
mail despite Poland’s decision to opt out of Article 10. G2A asserts that this alleged 
violation of the Convention required the District Court to quash the summons to Gate 
Arena. 
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The District Court declined to decide whether notice was delivered in accordance 
with the Hague Service Convention. Rather, the District Court held that “[e]ven 
assuming, without deciding, that the strictures of the Hague Service Convention are 
included in the administrative steps required by Powell, to the extent an administrative 
defect exists here G2A has not shown that it was prejudiced by it or that the government 
acted in bad faith by issuing the summons.” G2A.COM Sp. z.o.o. (Ltd.) v. United States, 
No. CV 17-MC-177-LPS, 2018 WL 4219237, at *5 (D. Del. Sept. 5, 2018).  
We do not consider here whether lack of bad faith and prejudice may excuse the 
IRS’s noncompliance with the Convention’s service requirements. Instead, we hold that 
the statute’s procedures for third-party summonses, 26 U.S.C. § 7609(a)(1), does not 
require service at all, so the Convention’s service requirements do not apply.  
The Hague Service Convention applies to service of documents. 20 U.S.T. 361 
(“[D]esiring to create appropriate means to ensure that judicial and extrajudicial 
documents to be served abroad shall be brought to the notice of the addressee in 
sufficient time.” (emphasis added)). The Supreme Court noted the Convention’s 
intentional focus on “service of process in the technical sense” in contrast with the 
broader, less formal concept of notice. Schlunk, 486 U.S. at 701.  And more recently, the 
Court  has confirmed “that the scope of the Convention is limited to service of 
documents,” without “apply[ing] to any communications that ‘do not culminate in 
service.’” Water Splash, Inc. v. Menon, 137 S. Ct. 1504, 1509 (2017) (quoting Schlunk, 
486 U.S. at 701). 
 
 
13 
 
Likewise, the Internal Revenue Code explicitly differentiates between “service” 
and “giving notice.” Under § 7603(a) of the Code, a summons is served, but under 
§ 7609(a)(1), notice of a third-party summons shall be given to the person identified in 
the summons. And § 7609(a)(2) explains that notice is sufficient when it is served or “is 
mailed by certified or registered mail to the last known address of such person.” By its 
plain meaning, the Internal Revenue Code permits notice by service or through the mail.4  
*   *   * 
 Because the IRS did not violate either the United States–Poland Tax Treaty or the 
Hague Service Convention when it timely sent notice of the third-party summons to G2A 
by registered mail, we will affirm the judgment of the District Court. 
                                              
4 G2A argues that the statute provides alternative means of service, not 
alternatives to service.  That interpretation conflicts with the plain meaning of the statute, 
and the cases cited by G2A do not support its theory. For example, Barmes v. United 
States, 199 F.3d 386 (7th Cir. 1999) did not address the distinction between service and 
giving notice, and nothing in the court’s language suggested that it intentionally equated 
the two concepts. And in Fortney v. United States, 59 F.3d 117 (9th Cir. 1995), the 
contested issue was whether the IRS must provide attested copies of third-party 
summonses to persons about whom information is requested; the court did not even 
consider the distinction between service of summons and giving notice.   
